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How well does the pivotal-voter model explain voter participation in small-scale elections? This
paper explores this question using data from Texas liquor referenda. It first structurally estimates the
parameters of a pivotal-voter model using the Texas data. It then uses the estimates to evaluate both
the within and out-of-sample performance of the model. The analysis shows that the model is
capable of predicting turnout in the data fairly well, but tends, on average, to predict closer electoral
outcomes than are observed in the data. This difficulty allows the pivotal-voter model to be

















The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the ability of the pivotal-voter model
to explain turnout in small-scale elections. According to this model, citizens are
motivated to vote by the chance that they might swing the election. Citizens are
assumed to rationally anticipate the probability that their votes will be pivotal and
to vote if the expected \instrumental bene¯t" outweighs the cost of going to the
polls. A positive level of turnout is assured in equilibrium, since if no citizen were
expected to vote, any deviator would be pivotal with probability one.
The pivotal-voter model, as developed by Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and Rosen-
thal (1983), (1985), forms the basic framework for thinking about turnout in theo-
retical political science. It is in many respects the simplest and most natural way of
thinking about the problem. It requires only that citizens be instrumentally moti-
vated and that they have rational expectations, core assumptions of rational choice
theory. It is relatively tractable and yields a number of interesting implications.1
Despite its theoretical appeal, it seems widely accepted that the pivotal-voter
model does not provide an empirically satisfactory theory of turnout in large-scale,
single-issue elections (see, for example, Feddersen (2004) and Green and Shapiro
(1994)). Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) showed that when voters are uncertain about
the preferences of their fellows, the critical cost levels below which citizens vote
converge to zero as the number of citizens approaches in¯nity. Thus, in order for
observed outcomes to be consistent with the model, the costs of voting for a large
group of citizens must be minuscule. Not only does this seem unlikely, but if it
were the case, then it is not clear how to explain the variation in turnout in large
elections observed in the data.
Palfrey and Rosenthal's result does not, however, rule out the possibility that
the pivotal-voter model provides a reasonable theory for understanding small-scale
elections and this seems to be the implicit justi¯cation for its continued use in
1 For example, Borgers (2004) uses the model to show that when citizens are ex-ante identical,
compelling citizens to vote is never desirable on welfare grounds (see also Ghosal and Lockwood
(2003)). Campbell (1999) uses the model to show how a policy outcome preferred by a small
minority of the electorate can be implemented under majority voting if the preferences of that
minority are strong or their costs of voting are low.
2theoretical work (see, for example, Borgers (2004)). With a relative small number
of voters (e.g., less than 5,000), the equilibrium probability of being pivotal is large
enough to motivate voters with positive costs of voting to participate. While it
would be cleaner to have a single model to explain turnout in all elections, there is
no obvious reason to believe that the forces driving turnout in small-scale elections
should be the same as those in large, single-issue elections. Moreover, the empirical
relevance of small-scale elections is perhaps greater than is often assumed, because
voters in national elections are often simultaneously voting on a host of local issues
where the number of voters is small.
To study the performance of the pivotal-voter model in small-scale elections, we
use the data set on Texas liquor referenda assembled by Coate and Conlin (2004).
The jurisdictions holding these elections are often very small, many having less than
1,000 eligible voters. These elections also have the advantage that they are typically
held separately from other elections, so that the only reason to go to the polls is
to vote on the proposed change in liquor law. Moreover, the issues decided by the
referenda are very similar across jurisdictions.
The paper begins by developing and structurally estimating a parameterized
version of the pivotal-voter model. The estimation is a computationally di±cult un-
dertaking, given the complexity of the equilibrium conditions implied by the pivotal-
voter model.2 Because of computational constraints, the parameters of the model
are estimated using only those elections in which the number of voting age citizens is
less than 900. We then explore how well the pivotal-voter model explains both total
turnout and the closeness of the referendum outcomes in these smaller jurisdictions
(i.e., \within-sample").3 We ¯nd that the model does well predicting total turnout
but predicts much closer elections than are seen in the data. We also use our coe±-
cient estimates to compute the equilibrium of the model in the larger jurisdictions
(between 906 and 81,904 eligible voters). For these \out-of-sample" observations,
2 Evaluating the expected bene¯t of voting requires computing the equilibrium probability that
a voter will be pivotal.
3 We de¯ne total turnout as the percent of eligible voters (i.e., voting age population) that
turn out to vote. We de¯ne closeness as the di®erence between turnout for and turnout against
the proposed change (i.e. the percent of eligible voters that vote for minus the percent of eligible
voters that vote against).
3the pivotal-voter model underpredicts total turnout.
Finally, we compare the within-sample performance of the pivotal-voter model
with that of a simple alternative model based on the idea of expressive voting. This
model - the intensity model - simply assumes that citizens vote to express their
preferences and that their expressive payo®s are higher the more intensely they feel
about an issue. We ¯nd that this very simple view of voting explains the election
outcomes better than the considerably more sophisticated pivotal-voter model.
To date, despite its popularity in theoretical work, there has been very little
research directly testing the performance of the pivotal-voter model. This re°ects
both the di±culty of ¯nding appropriate data and the analytical di±culties of im-
plementing the model. Indeed, to our knowledge, the only other paper to have even
attempted the task is Hansen, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1987). They use data on
school budget referenda and make strong assumptions to undertake the estimation.
In particular, they assume that the population is equally divided between supporters
and opposers of the proposed budget and that both sides have identical bene¯ts from
their preferred outcomes. Consistent with these simplifying assumptions, Hansen,
Palfrey and Rosenthal estimate the parameters of the model using only referenda
with \close" outcomes and focus only on total turnout. As we do, they ¯nd that the
model estimates match observed levels of turnout reasonably well. However, our
analysis imposes neither the equal division nor the identical bene¯ts assumption,
which allows us to estimate the parameters of the model using all election outcomes
(close and non-close). This permits us to analyze the model predictions regarding
not only total turnout but also closeness.
Our paper complements the recent work of Coate and Conlin (2004). Using the
same data set, Coate and Conlin structurally estimate the parameters of a novel
model of voter turnout which assumes that individuals are motivated to vote by
the ethical desire to do their part to help their side win.4 They show that this
group rule-utilitarian model ¯ts the data well and performs better than the simple
intensity model of voter turnout discussed above. While this is certainly interesting,
it is natural to wonder how the more standard pivotal-voter model would fare in this
4 This model is based on the ideas of Harsanyi (1980) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2002).
4environment and this is the issue we take up here. Unfortunately, we are unable to
provide direct comparisons of all three models because Coate and Conlin's analysis
makes the simplifying assumption of a continuum of voters. This must be dispensed
with here because it implies that no voter can be pivotal. However, the intensity
model is su±ciently simple that it can be easily estimated with either a ¯nite or
a continuum of voters, so we are able to compare its performance with that of the
pivotal-voter model.5
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section
presents our parameterized version of the pivotal-voter model. Section 3 describes
the institutional details concerning the referenda that we study and the data. Sec-
tion 4 explains our estimation strategy and Section 5 describes the results. Section
6 introduces the intensity model and compares its performance with that of the
pivotal-voter model. Section 7 summarizes the results and discusses their implica-
tions for future research on voter turnout.
2 The pivotal-voter model
A community is holding a referendum. There are n citizens, indexed by i 2 f1;:::;ng.
These citizens are divided into supporters and opposers of the proposal. Supporters
obtain a bene¯t b from the proposed change, while opposers incur a loss x. Each
citizen knows whether he is a supporter or an opposer, but does not know the
number of citizens in each category. All citizens know the probability of a randomly
selected individual being a supporter is ¹.
Citizens must decide whether to vote in the referendum. If they do, supporters
vote in favor and opposers vote against. Each citizen i faces a cost of voting ci where
ci is the realization of a random variable uniformly distributed on [0;c]. Citizens
observe their own voting costs, but only know that the costs of their fellows are the
independent realizations of n ¡ 1 random variables.
The only bene¯t of voting is the instrumental bene¯t of changing the outcome.
Since the probability of being pivotal depends upon who else is voting, voting is a
5 Estimating the group rule-utilitarian model with a ¯nite number of voters is computationally
infeasible.
5strategic decision. Accordingly, the situation is modelled as a game of incomplete
information in which nature chooses the number of supporters and citizens' voting
costs. Then, each citizen, having observed his own voting cost, decides whether or
not to vote. If the number of votes in favor of the referendum is at least as big as
the number against, the proposed change is approved.
A strategy for a citizen i is a function which for each possible realization of his
voting cost speci¯es whether he will vote or abstain. The equilibrium concept is
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium - each citizen must be happy with his strategy given
the strategies of the other citizens and his statistical knowledge concerning the
distribution of supporters and voting costs. Following Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985),
we look for a symmetric equilibrium in which supporters and opposers use common
strategies. With no loss of generality, we can assume that supporters and opposers
use \cut-o®" strategies that specify that they vote if and only if their cost of voting
is below some critical level. Accordingly, a symmetric equilibrium is characterized
by a pair of numbers °¤
s and °¤
o representing the cut-o® cost levels of the two groups.
To characterize the equilibrium cut-o® levels, consider the decision of some citi-
zen i. Suppose the remaining n¡1 citizens are playing according to the equilibrium





o) denote the probability that vs of the n¡1 individuals vote in support
and vo vote in opposition when they play according to the equilibrium strategies.
We show how to compute this below. Recall that the referendum passes if and only
if at least as many people vote for as against the proposed change. Thus, if citizen
i is a supporter, he will be pivotal whenever v of the n¡1 other individuals vote in
opposition and v ¡ 1 vote in support. In all other circumstances, his vote does not






Individual i will wish to vote if this expected bene¯t exceeds his cost of voting.








If citizen i is an opposer, he will be pivotal whenever v of the n ¡ 1 other
individuals vote in opposition and v vote in support. In all other circumstances, his













Equations (2) and (4) give us two equations in the two unknown equilibrium
variables °¤
s and °¤
o. The exogenous parameters of the model are the probability
that each individual is a supporter ¹, the bene¯t to supporters b, the loss to opposers
x, and the upper bound of the cost distribution c. Existence of an equilibrium pair °¤
s
and °¤
o for any given values of the exogenous parameters is not an issue (see Ledyard
(1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)), but there might in principle be multiple
solutions. While Borgers (2004) has shown that there is a unique equilibrium when
b = x and ¹ = 1=2, there is no general uniqueness result in the literature.
To compute equilibria we need to know the function ½(vs;vo;°¤
s;°¤
o). Let P(s)







¹s(1 ¡ ¹)n¡1¡s: (5)














Similarly, the probability that vo 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1 ¡ sg vote in opposition is
µ












































Because (2) and (4) are a system of nonlinear equations, with no reduced form
solution, equilibria can only be found numerically. This is a computationally di±cult
problem. There is no algorithm guaranteeing that a solution of a system of linear
equations can be found, let alone all solutions. Our approach is to use a standard
root-computation routine to ¯nd a solution from a user-given starting point.
3 Texas liquor referenda
3.1 Institutional background 7
Chapter 251 of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code states that \On proper petition
by the required number of voters of a county, or of a justice precinct or incorporated
city or town in the county, the Commissioners' Court shall order a local election in
the political subdivision to determine whether or not the sale of alcoholic beverages
of one or more of the various types and alcoholic contents shall be prohibited or
legalized in the county, justice precinct, or incorporated city or town". Thus, citizens
can propose changes in the liquor laws of their communities and have their proposals
directly voted on in a referendum. Such direct democracy has a long history in Texas,
with local liquor elections dating back to the mid-1800s.
The process by which citizens may propose a change for their jurisdiction is
relatively straightforward. The ¯rst step involves applying to the Registrar of Voters
for a petition. This only requires the signatures of ten or more registered voters in
the jurisdiction. The hard work comes after receipt of the petition. The applicants
must get it signed by at least 35% of the registered voters in their jurisdiction
and must do this within thirty days.8 If this hurdle is successfully completed, the
7This discussion of the institutional details draws on Coate and Conlin (2004).
8 Prior to 1993, the number of signatures needed was 35% of the total number of votes cast in
the last preceding gubernatorial election.
8Commissioners' Court of the county to which the jurisdiction belongs must order a
referendum be held. This order must be issued at its ¯rst regular session following
the completion of the petition and the referendum must be held between twenty
and thirty days from the time of the order. All registered voters can vote and if
the proposed change receives at least as many a±rmative as negative votes, it is
approved.
Citizens may propose changes for their entire county, their justice precinct, or
the city or town in which they reside. The state is divided into 254 counties and each
county is divided into justice precincts.9 Accordingly, a justice precinct lies within
the county to which it belongs. By contrast, a city may spillover into two or more
justice precincts. If only part of a city belongs to a particular justice precinct that
has approved a change, then that part must abide by the new regulations. However,
if the city then subsequently approved a di®erent set of regulations, they would also
be binding on the part contained in the justice precinct in question. E®ectively,
current regulations are determined by the most recently approved referendum.
Importantly for our purposes, liquor referenda are typically held separately from
other elections. Section 41.01 of the Texas Election Laws sets aside four dates each
year as uniform election dates. These are the dates when presidential, gubernatorial,
and congressional elections are held. In addition, other issues are often decided on
these days such as the election of aldermen, and the approval of the sale of public
land and bond issuances. Elections pertaining to these other issues may occur, but
rarely do, on dates other than uniform election days. Liquor referenda, in contrast,
do not typically occur on uniform election dates. This re°ects the tight restrictions
placed by Chapter 251 on the timing of elections.10
3.2 Data
Coate and Conlin (2004) assembled data on 366 local liquor elections in Texas
between 1976 and 1996 where prior to the election the voting jurisdictions prohibited
9 The number of justice precincts in a county range from 1 to 8.
10 Interestingly, the Texas state government voted in 2001 to require liquor law referendum votes
to occur on one of the four uniform election dates. This was to avoid the costs of holding referenda
separately.
9Small jurisdictions Large jurisdictions
Number of referenda 144 222
Jurisdiction characteristics
Voting age population 370 (200) 6,539 (8,742)
Fraction of baptists 52% (11) 46% (14)
Located in an MSA 44% (50) 43% (50)
Incorporated city or town 95% (22) 42% (50)
Referendum characteristics
Beer/wine 46% (50) 37% (48)
O®-premise 40% (49) 39% (49)
O®- and on-premise 15% (35) 24% (43)
More liberal than county 42% (49) 28% (45)
Held on weekend 68% (47) 72% (45)
Turnout 54% (19) 24% (15)
Closeness -1.0% (21) -1.9% (6.7)
Table 1: Summary Statistics (standard deviations in parentheses)
the retail sale of all alcohol. The Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission provided
the details of the referenda as well as the election results. This data was augmented
with information from the U.S. Census and Churches & Church Membership in
the U.S.. The voting age population in these 366 jurisdictions averaged 4,112 and
ranged from 43 to 81,904. Because of computational constraints, we estimate the
parameters of the pivotal-voter model using only those \small" elections where the
number of citizens over age 18 is less than 900. There are 144 such referenda.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the \within-sample" (less than 900 voting
age citizens) and \out-of-sample" observations (more than 900 voting age citizens).
The average number of eligible voters is 370 for the smaller jurisdictions and 6,539
for the larger jurisdictions. The fraction of baptists in the population and the
fraction located in an MSA are similar across small and large jurisdictions. Small


















Figure 1: Voter turnout as a percent of eligible voters in the data
that are not incorporated cities or towns are almost all justice precincts, with only
two referenda involving an entire county (both large jurisdictions).
While all the elections involved eliminating restrictions imposed on the sale of
alcohol, they di®ered in the scope of reform. Beer/wine referenda permit only the
sale of beer and wine. O®-premise referenda allow the sale of all liquor for con-
sumption o®-premise (i.e., no bars). O®- and on-premise referenda are the most
permissive, permitting both o®- and on-premise consumption of all liquor. Table 1
indicates that for both the small and large jurisdictions, the majority of referenda
were either beer/wine or o®-premise. Observe also that referenda in small jurisdic-
tions are more likely to be proposing a more liberal policy than prevailing in the
rest of the county. The fraction of elections held on the weekend is similar across
the sets.
Table 1 indicates that turnout is substantially lower in the larger jurisdictions,
24% of eligible voters as opposed to 54%. Figure 1 provides a closer look at the

















Figure 2: Distribution over vote closeness in the data
percent turnout in each jurisdiction and the dark line is a polynomial ¯t across
these observations.11 This line indicates that turnout decreases sharply from almost
80% in small jurisdictions to about 20% as the jurisdiction size increases up to
approximately 5,000 eligible voters. However, it levels o® when the number of
eligible voters is greater than 5,000.
Table 1 also reports information on closeness, de¯ned as the di®erence between
percent turnout for and percent turnout against the proposed change. Turnout for
is, on average, 1.0% less and 1.9% less than turnout against in the small and large
jurisdictions, respectively. This resulted in 45% of the referenda passing in the small
jurisdictions and 40% in the large jurisdictions. The standard deviations associated
with these average closeness ¯gures indicate that elections in small jurisdictions are
more likely to be close. The average winning margin, de¯ned as the absolute value of
closeness is 16% in the small jurisdictions compared to 4.6% in the large jurisdictions.
Figure 2 depicts, for both small and large jurisdictions, the distribution of closeness.
11 The ¯gure omits two outliers with more than 45,000 eligible voters.
12The solid line shows the kernel density estimate of the closeness of the referendum
outcomes in small jurisdictions while the dashed line is the kernel density estimate
for the larger jurisdictions. Figure 2 indicates that there is considerable variation




Our goal is to provide inference on the parameters of the model using the data
on election outcomes in Texas liquor referenda. Before describing in detail the
estimation procedure, it is important to discuss what features of the data allow us
to identify the coe±cients associated with the model's parameters. Recall that the
model outlined in section 2 is characterized by just four parameters: the supporters'
bene¯t b; the opposers' loss x; the probability that a citizen is a supporter ¹; and
the upper bound of the uniform cost distribution, c. We will consider how changes
in the values of the parameters impact the outcome predicted by the model.
To simplify the discussion, assume that all jurisdictions share the same values
of b; x; ¹; and c: Note ¯rst that only the relative values of b; x; and c matter;
that is, when b; x; and c are multiplied by the same factor, the equilibrium values
of °s and °o are also scaled by the same factor, and the probability of observing
a referendum outcome (the number of votes for and against) conditional on the
equilibrium cut-o® levels is independent of the scaling factor. Therefore, under the
simplifying assumption that all jurisdictions are identical, c is not identi¯ed, and we
can normalize c to 1.
Next observe that the combined magnitude of parameters b and x e®ects overall
turnout, because increasing the bene¯ts from winning the election increases the
incentives to vote, and therefore turnout. What is left is the determination of the
di®erence b¡x and ¹. Both b¡x and ¹ are identi¯ed from the observed di®erence
12 This pattern remains when the jurisdictions are broken into smaller subsamples based on
number of eligible voters.
13between turnout for and turnout against. We are able to separately identify b ¡ x
and ¹ because: (i) a change in b ¡ x has di®erent e®ects than a change in ¹ on
turnout; and (ii) the di®erential e®ects of changes in b¡x and ¹ vary with the size
of the jurisdiction and total turnout. For example, the di®erence between votes for
and against provides more information on ¹ relative to b ¡ x when a jurisdiction
has high total turnout and a large number of eligible voters: Hence, variation in
closeness of the electoral outcome across jurisdictions with di®erent levels of turnout
and di®erent numbers of eligible voters facilitate the identi¯cation of ¹ from b ¡ x:
We conclude that, under the assumption that all jurisdictions have identical b;
x; ¹; and c, identi¯cation of these parameters is possible (after normalizing the
cost of voting) provided that su±cient variation exists across jurisdictions in eligi-
ble voters and referendum outcome. In our empirical implementation, we allow the
four parameters to have di®erent values by having them depend on exogenous ju-
risdiction characteristics. The coe±cients associated with these jurisdiction speci¯c
variables are identi¯ed from the variation in electoral outcomes across jurisdictions
with di®erent exogenous characteristics.
4.2 Estimation procedure
We assume that each of our 144 jurisdictions is characterized by a distinct quadruple
of parameters (¹j,bj,xj,cj) but that each parameter is determined by jurisdiction and
referenda speci¯c characteristics in a common way. Speci¯cally, for each jurisdiction






































are vectors of observable jurisdiction and referenda characteristics. More speci¯cally,
zb
j = zx
j =(1, o®-premise, o®- and on-premise, incorporated city or town, more liberal
14than county); z
¹
j = (1, fraction baptist, MSA), and zc
j =(election on weekend). The
functional forms for bj, xj and cj are selected so that they are positive and the
functional form for ¹j is selected to ensure that it lies between zero and one. The
formulation also embodies the normalization that cj equals 1 when the election is
not held on the weekend.
The task is to estimate the coe±cients (¯b; ¯x; ¯¹; ¯c). For each jurisdiction j
we observe the votes for and against the proposed change, together with the total
number of eligible voters which we denote respectively as vsj;voj; and nj. The choice
of (¯b; ¯x; ¯¹; ¯c) determine bj;xj;¹j and cj and these determine via equations (2)





Each equilibrium implies a probability distribution over election outcomes. In
particular, the probability of observing data (vsj;voj) conditional on the citizens
voting according to the cut-o® levels (°sj;°oj) is given by (8). While it is impossible
to know a priori whether there are multiple equilibria, if there is multiplicity we need
to ensure that there is a unique mapping from the parameter space to the likelihood
of observable events. We resolve this issue by assuming that the equilibrium selected
is the ¯rst equilibrium the computation routine ¯nds, using as a starting point of
the routine the midpoint of the strategy space.13
Assuming the above equilibrium selection rule, denote the selected equilibrium
(°m¤
sj ;°m¤
oj ). Then, equation (8) de¯nes the likelihood of observing a referendum
outcome conditional on the equilibrium cut-o® levels (°m¤
sj ;°m¤








The estimation strategy is the following: ¯rst, guess a vector of coe±cient values (¯b;
¯x; ¯¹; ¯c): Then compute equilibrium critical cost levels for each jurisdiction (based
13 An alternative procedure is to assume an equilibrium selection rule, and estimate the param-
eters of the equilibrium selection rule together with the parameters of the model. We experimented
with this procedure, but found it computationally unfeasible. The procedure we chose is arbitrary
only to the extent in which multiplicity is prevalent. We investigated this issue and found that mul-
tiplicity does not arise very often. We thoroughly searched for equilibria using a grid of parameter
vectors centered around our estimates. For all of these parameter vectors, we found multiplicity in
less than ten percent of the jurisdictions. At the estimated values of the parameters, we found only
7 jurisdictions displaying multiple equilibria.
15on the equilibrium selection rule stated above), and the probability of observing the
jurisdiction election outcome conditional on such thresholds. These probabilities
determine the likelihood of observing the data given by L(¯b;¯x;¯¹;¯c): Finally,
¯nd the coe±cient values that maximize L(¯b;¯x;¯¹;¯c).
The sums in equations (2), (4), and (8) take progressively longer to compute as
the number of eligible voters increases, making the computation of the equilibria
extremely time consuming in large jurisdictions, even using Normal approximations
to the Binomial distributions. This explains why we limited our sample to the 144
observations with the smallest number of eligible voters.14
5 Results
5.1 Coe±cient estimates
Table 2 contains the coe±cient values that maximize the likelihood function, with
bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, while Table 3 provides the average
values of the model's exogenous variables implied by these parameter estimates.
The point estimates in Table 2 suggest that the probability an individual is a
supporter does not depend appreciably on the fraction of baptists in the jurisdic-
tion or on whether the jurisdiction is located in an MSA. The coe±cient estimates
associated with the bene¯t and loss parameters, b and x, suggest that the e®ect of
the jurisdiction-speci¯c characteristics on preferences are often quite large and sim-
ilar for supporters and opposers. Both supporters and opposers bene¯t more from
their preferred outcome if the jurisdiction holding the election is an incorporated
city or town. Less intuitively, both groups' bene¯ts are less for o®- and on-premise
referenda compared to o®-premise referenda and beer/wine referenda (the omitted
category). The average supporter's bene¯t and opposer's loss almost double when
the jurisdiction is a city/town and are approximately ¯fty percent less for an o®-
and on-premise referendum than a beer/wine referendum. The bene¯t and loss pa-
rameters increase slightly if the referendum passing results in the jurisdiction having
14 We used an implementation of the simulated annealing method developed by Bill Go®e (see
Go®e et al. (1992)) to maximize (13) on a 16-processor supercomputer.
16Parameter/Variable (ln L : ¡5694:21) Estimate Marginal E®ect
¹: Fraction of baptists -0.058 (0.188) -0.015
Located in an MSA -0.089 (0.072) -0.022
Constant 0.062 (0.097)
b: O®-premise 0.182 (0.086) 2.85
O®- and on-premise -0.642 (0.232) -7.89
Incorporated city or town 1.819 (0.354) 13.68
More liberal than county 0.199 (0.068) 3.15
Constant 0.875 (0.405)
x: O®-premise consumption 0.097 (0.082) 1.56
O®- and on-premise -0.589 (0.253) -7.58
Incorporated city or town 1.791 (0.340) 13.97
More liberal than county 0.361 (0.062) 5.90
Constant 0.886 (0.370)
c: Held on weekend -0.172 (0.085) -0.16
Table 2: Pivotal voter model estimates (standard errors in parentheses)15
a more liberal alcohol policy than in the rest of the county. In terms of the cost
of voting, the coe±cient estimates suggest that having an election on a weekend
decreases average voting costs by approximately 16 percent.
The average values of the model's exogenous variables implied by the parameter
estimates (Table 3) indicate that, on average, citizens are evenly divided between
supporters and opposers (i.e., ¹ = :50). The average bene¯t of supporters is slightly
less than the loss of opposers, which means that the average probability a supporter
votes is slightly less than that of an opposer (0.516 versus 0.530). These probabil-
ities are quite large because both the average bene¯t to supporters and the loss to
opposers are approximately 35 times greater than the average voting costs.
The implied values of the model's exogenous variables (Table 3) can be inter-
preted in dollar terms if we assign a value to the cost of voting. For example, suppose
15 For the \Fraction of baptists" variable, the marginal e®ect column reports the percent change
in the value of parameter ¹ given a one percent change in the fraction of baptists. For all other
variables, which are all dummies, the entry is the percent change in the value of the parameter with
respect to the change from zero to one in the independent variable.
17Parameter Mean estimate
Fraction of supporters ¹ 0.500 (0.011)
Supporters' bene¯t b 15.52 (4.81)
Opposers' bene¯t x 15.90 (5.12)







Table 3: Mean parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
that we guess that the average voting cost across all jurisdictions is $10. Then, this
implies that c=2 = 0:892=2 = $10. This ties down the units in dollar terms since
0:892 = $20 or 1 = $20=(0:892) = $22:42. It follows that the average value of b
is $22:42(15:52) = $347:98 and the average value of x is $22:42(15:90) = $356:50.
These numbers are on the large side, but within the range of plausibility.
5.2 Model performance
We begin with the within-sample ¯t of the model. Two distinct dimensions of model
performance may be identi¯ed. First, how well does the model predict total turnout?
Second, how well does the model predict the closeness of the election, that is, the
di®erence between turnout for and turnout against the proposed change?
To obtain the predicted voting behavior, we use the coe±cient estimates in Table
2 to calculate the implied values of the model's parameters (bj;xj;¹j;cj) for each ju-
risdiction and compute a pair of cut-o® levels (°¤
sj;°¤
oj) that satis¯es the equilibrium
conditions (2) and (4). Then we simulate election outcomes for all 144 jurisdictions.
We do this by letting the computer draw for each jurisdiction a particular realization
of preferences and cost shocks from the distribution associated with that jurisdic-
tion. Thus, in jurisdiction j, the probability that a citizen is a supporter is ¹j and
each citizen's voting cost is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0;cj]. These
draws together with the equilibrium cut-o®s then determine turnout for and against
the proposed change. Each (aggregate) draw determines a sample with a pattern
18Eligible voters n N. of obs. Data
Pivotal-voter
model
n < 247 48 0.62 0.65
247 < n < 434 48 0.55 0.51
434 < n < 900 48 0.43 0.40
All within-sample (n < 900) 144 0.54 0.52
Table 4: Average turnout as a percentage of eligible voters: model vs.
data
of election outcomes across the jurisdictions. By repeating the procedure numerous
times and averaging across all samples we can compute the predicted distributions
for total turnout and closeness implied by the model.
Table 4 compares average actual turnout with the average predicted from the
simulations. It does this for all within-sample observations and for various smaller
subsamples based on jurisdiction size. The table indicates that the pivotal-voter
model is relatively accurate in predicting the average total turnout of 0.54 for all
within-sample observations as well as the average turnouts for the equally-sized
subsamples.
The performance of the model in predicting the electoral outcomes of out-of-
sample jurisdictions is worse. To obtain the predicted voting behavior for the out-of-
sample jurisdictions, we assume the coe±cient estimates in Table 2 apply and again
compute a pair of critical cost levels that satis¯es the equilibrium conditions.16
We then calculate the predicted distributions over turnout. Unlike the within-
sample comparison, the model signi¯cantly under-predicts turnout for the large
jurisdictions. The average actual turnout in these out-of-sample observations is
0.24 while the pivotal-voter model predicts an average of 0.14. This is perhaps not
surprising in light of the theoretical result from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) that
we cite in the introduction.
16 This procedure assumes that the coe±cients estimated for the smaller jurisdictions are valid


















Figure 3: Distributions over closeness, model vs. data (within-sample)
Turning to closeness, Figure 3 depicts the distributions of actual and predicted
closeness obtained from our simulations. The darker line is the predicted kernel
density estimate of the distribution from the model, while the lighter line is a kernel
density estimate of the distribution in the data. It is evident from Figure 3 that
the model predicts much closer elections than are observed in the data. This seems
likely to re°ect the basic logic of the model - if an election were not expected to be
close, then the probability of being pivotal would be very low and there would be
little incentive to vote. However, another possible explanation involves jurisdiction-
speci¯c heterogeneity not accounted for by our set of covariates. This unobserved
heterogeneity makes us reluctant to use the evidence on closeness alone to declare
the pivotal-voter model unsatisfactory. Therefore, in the next section we compare
the performance of the pivotal-voter model to that of a simple alternative model,
which we estimate using the same set of explanatory variables.
206 A simple alternative model
While the pivotal-voter model yields reasonable coe±cient estimates and ¯ts the
pattern of turnout within-sample reasonably well, it predicts that elections will be
much closer than they actually are. It is therefore natural to wonder whether a
simpler model based on the idea of citizens voting for non-instrumental reasons
might ¯t the data better. To investigate this we study the comparative performance
of a simple expressive model of voting.
The expressive view asserts that citizens vote not to impact the outcome but
to express their preferences (see, for example, Brennan and Lomasky (1993)). It
seems natural to assume that people care more about expressing their preferences
the more intensely they feel about an issue. This suggests what Coate and Conlin
(2004) refer to as the intensity model which works within the same basic environment
as the pivotal-voter model but assumes that supporters vote if their voting cost is
less than °s = ®b, while opposers vote if their voting cost is less than °o = ®x, where
® > 0. Here, the parameter ® measures the strength of citizens' desire to express
themselves through voting. The key restriction is that both supporters and opposers
share the same ®. Under this speci¯cation, the probability that a supporter votes
is the probability that °s exceeds his voting cost, which is °s=c = ®b=c. Similarly,
the probability that an opposer votes is °o=c = ®x=c: Note that, unlike the pivotal-
voter model, the propensity of a supporter (opposer) to vote does not depend on
the propensity of an opposer (supporter) to vote.
We assume that the parameters bj, xj, ¹j, and cj depend on the same jurisdiction
characteristics as in the pivotal-voter model (see equations 9-12). In addition, we
assume that:
®j = (number of eligible voters in jurisdiction j)
¯ (14)
Thus, we allow citizens' desire to express themselves to vary with the size of their
community. Observe that our speci¯cation for ®j contains no constant term. This
normalization re°ects the fact that we cannot separately identify ®j, bj and xj. The
e®ect on voting behavior of an increase in the desire of citizens to express themselves
(i.e., an increase in ®j) can be mimicked by an increase in how strongly they feel
21Parameter / Variable (ln L: -4298.0) Estimate Marginal E®ect
¹: Fraction of baptists -0.647 (0.128) -0.157
Located in an MSA -0.362 (0.025) -0.088
Constant 0.180 (0.095)
b: O®-premise 0.163 (0.019) 0.406
O®- and on-premise -0.305 (0.032) -0.670
Incorporated city or town 0.504 (0.039) 0.992
More liberal than county 0.057 (0.018) 0.141
Constant 0.359 (0.069)
x: O®-premise 0.554 (0.015) 0.118
O®- and on-premise -0.631 (0.032) -1.065
Incorporated city or town 0.032 (0.031) 0.067
More liberal than county 0.247 (0.016) 0.532
Constant 0.659 (0.092)
c: Held on weekend 0.007 (0.012) 0.007
®: Eligible voters -0.252 (0.010) -7.62
Table 5: Intensity model estimates (standard errors in parenthesis)17
about the issue (i.e., a simultaneous increase in bj and xj). Accordingly, we can
only identify the aggregate expressive bene¯ts to supporters and opposers which are
®jbj and ®jxj. This is not problematic given that our primary goal is to compare
the ¯t of this model with that of the pivotal-voter model.
The task is to estimate the coe±cients (¯b;¯x;¯¹;¯c;¯) and the estimation
procedure is similar to that for the pivotal-voter model. The choice of coe±cients
determines ®jbj, ®jxj, cj and ¹j and these determine the cut-o®s (°sj = ®jbj;
°oj = ®jxj). The probability of observing data (vsj;voj) conditional on citizens
voting according to the cut-o®s (°sj;°oj) is given by (8). The likelihood function is
then L(­) = ¦j½(vsj;voj;°sj;°oj) and the estimation strategy is as before.
17 For the \Fraction of baptists" variable, the marginal e®ect column reports the percent change
in the value of parameter ¹ given a one percent change in the fraction of baptists. For the "Eligible
voters" variable, the marginal e®ect column reports the percent change in the value of parameter ®
given an increase in eligible voters of 100. For all other variables, which are all dummies, the entry
is the percent change in the value of the parameter with respect to the change from zero to one in
22Parameter Mean estimate
Fraction of supporters ¹ 0.423 (0.043)
Supporters' expressive bene¯t ®b 0.585 (0.138)
Opposers' expressive bene¯t ®x 0.504 (0.137)







Table 6: Mean parameter estimates
Table 5 contains the coe±cient estimates that maximize this likelihood func-
tion using the 144 smaller jurisdictions. In general, these are as expected given
the results in Coate and Conlin (2004) and are similar to those for the pivotal-voter
model.18 The estimate associated with baptists implies that the probability of being
a supporter is 15.7 percentage points less if the individual is baptist. The coe±-
cient associated with the MSA variable suggests that being in an MSA decreases
the probability an individual is a supporter by 8.8 percentage points. The coe±-
cients associated with the b and x parameters indicate that individuals feel more
strongly about the referendum if: (i) it is an o®-premise referendum (as opposed
to beer/wine); (ii) if the jurisdiction is an incorporated city or town; and (iii) if
it results in the jurisdiction having the most liberal alcohol policy in the county.
Individuals feel less strongly about o®- and on-premise referenda. The negative
coe±cient associated with the eligible voters implies that increasing the number of
eligible voters by 100 in a jurisdiction decreases the desire citizens have to express
themselves by, on average, 7.6 percent.
Table 6 uses the coe±cient estimates to present the average implied values of
the model's exogenous variables. The probability of an eligible voter being a sup-
the independent variable.
18 Coate and Conlin (2004) estimate the intensity model using the full data set, but assume a
continuum of voters. The continuum assumption makes votes for and against deterministic and
hence it is necessary to introduce some uncertainty into the model for estimation purposes. This is
done by assuming that the fraction of supporters is a draw from a Beta distribution and that there
is unobserved district speci¯c heterogeneity in the willingness to pay of supporters and opposers.
23Eligible voters n N of Obs. Data
Intensity
model
n < 247 48 0.62 0.63
247 < n < 434 48 0.55 0.53
434 < n < 900 48 0.43 0.45
All within-sample (n < 900) 144 0.54 0.54
Table 7: Average turnout as a percentage of eligible voters: intensity
model vs. data
porter averages 0.423 across the 144 jurisdictions which is less than predicted by the
pivotal-voter model. As with the pivotal-voter model, the implied probabilities of a
supporter and opposer voting are both slightly over a half.
While the coe±cient estimates and implied average values are of some interest,
we are most concerned with the relative performance of the intensity and pivotal-
voter models. To statistically test their relative performance, ¯rst note that the
maximized log-likelihood value is -4,298 for the intensity model compared to -5,694
for the pivotal-voter model.19 Using the likelihood-ratio based statistic for non-
nested models proposed by Vuong (1989), we can test the null hypothesis that
the two models are equally close to the true data generating process against the
alternative hypothesis that the intensity model is closer.20 Vuong's test statistic for
this null hypothesis is 1.88. Because this statistic has a standard normal distribution
if the two models are equivalent, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the ten
percent signi¯cance level.
The predictive power of the two models is also di®erent. Table 7 is analogous
to Table 4. It demonstrates that, like the pivotal-voter model, the intensity model
does well in predicting average total turnout. Figure 4 allows a comparison of
19 The maximum log-likelihood value for the intensity model is -4,567 when ® is constant.
20 The test statistic is calculated by taking the di®erence between the maximum log-likelihood
values of the models and dividing by the product of the standard deviation of the di®erence in the
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Figure 4: Distributions over closeness, pivotal and intensity model vs
data (within-sample)
the relative performance of the intensity and pivotal-voter models in regards to
predicting closeness. The left panel reproduces Figure 3, while the right panel is the
analogous ¯gure constructed using the simulations from the intensity model. While
the intensity model predicts closer elections than are observed in the data, it does
a better job than the pivotal-voter model at predicting the distribution of actual
vote di®erences. Because the intensity model is not driven by the instrumental
desire to impact the outcome, the model can generate large vote di®erences without
jeopardizing turnout.
We also looked at the relative performance of the models in subsamples of the
data formed according to the number of eligible voters. We found that the perfor-
mance of the pivotal-voter model worsens as the number of eligible voters increases.
Simulations on the out-of-sample observations indicate that the pivotal-voter model
predicts a much more concentrated distribution of closeness than that depicted in
Figure 4. The performance of the intensity model remains comparable to that dis-
played in Figure 4.21
21 We also computed closeness as the supporters' vote share of total turnout. All of the results
257 Conclusion
The pivotal-voter model forms the basic framework for thinking about turnout in
theoretical political science. While it seems widely conceded that the model does
not provide an empirically satisfactory theory of turnout in large-scale, single-issue
elections, the hope has remained that it might explain voter behavior in small-scale
elections. It is this hope that seems to implicitly justify the continued use of the
model in theoretical work.
The results of this paper provide little to nurture this hope. While the pivotal-
voter model can explain turnout in small-scale Texas liquor elections, it has di±culty
explaining the large winning margins that are common in these elections. The
logic of the pivotal-voter model implies that elections must be close even if there
is a signi¯cant di®erence between the sizes of the two competing groups or the
intensity of their preferences. This di±culty in explaining large winning margins
allows the pivotal-voter model to be outperformed by the intensity model - a simple
expressive voting model which just assumes that people are more likely to vote the
more intensely they feel about the issue.
Using the same data set, Coate and Conlin (2004) have shown that a model
of voter turnout in which individuals are motivated to vote by ethical reasons, ¯ts
the data well and outperforms the intensity model. Transitivity does not strictly
speaking apply, because Coate and Conlin's analysis makes di®erent assumptions,
most notably a continuum of voters. Nonetheless, the combined results of the two
papers certainly suggest that an ethical approach is a better way of understanding
voter behavior than the pivotal-voter model. In our view, this reinforces the case
for further development of the ethical approach.
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